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A GAME CHANGER?  THE IMPACT OF PADILLA 
V. KENTUCKY ON THE COLLATERAL 
CONSEQUENCES RULE AND INEFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIMS 
Joanna Rosenberg* 
 
The Sixth Amendment entitles a criminal defendant to effective assistance 
of counsel when deciding whether to plead guilty.  Defense counsel, 
therefore, must ensure that his client understands the direct consequences 
of the plea:  the nature of the criminal charge and the sentence.  However, 
pursuant to the traditional collateral consequences rule employed by most 
courts, counsel has no Sixth Amendment obligation to warn that criminal 
defendant of so-called collateral consequences, such as mandatory sex 
offender registration, civil commitment, or ineligibility for parole.  Prior to 
2010, deportation was also considered a collateral consequence of a guilty 
plea in most jurisdictions. 
In Padilla v. Kentucky, the U.S. Supreme Court made deportation an 
exception to the collateral consequences rule, and held for the first time 
that counsel’s failure to advise a criminal defendant of the deportation 
consequences of a guilty plea constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel.  
Lower courts have differed on whether to interpret Padilla as effecting a 
change to the collateral consequences rule, and more specifically, how to 
define direct consequences, in the context of an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim.  This Note examines the conflict, and concludes that courts 
should redefine the scope of direct consequences in light of the factors 
considered by the Court in Padilla. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine that you are a noncitizen charged with a criminal offense.  The 
prosecution presents a plea bargain:  you plead guilty in exchange for a 
reduced prison sentence.  Your case does not look promising, and the plea 
bargain seems like a great offer.  But is there a catch?  An overwhelming 
number of criminal offenses result in the deportation of noncitizens like you  
Would you want your lawyer to tell you if accepting the guilty plea would 
cause you to be deported?  Almost certainly yes.  But does your lawyer 
have a constitutional duty to do this? 
Until a few years ago, the answer was probably not.  However, in Padilla 
v. Kentucky,1 the U.S. Supreme Court held that an attorney’s failure to warn 
his client that pleading guilty to a criminal drug charge would result in his 
deportation constituted ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the 
Sixth Amendment.2  Recognizing the severity of a deportation 
consequence, the Court determined that Padilla’s counsel failed to give him 
the constitutionally adequate assistance required under the Sixth 
Amendment’s Counsel Clause.3  This decision by the Padilla Court has the 
potential to effect a sea change in ineffective assistance of counsel 
jurisprudence. 
The distinction between the direct and collateral consequences of a guilty 
plea runs throughout both state and federal jurisprudence.4  Pursuant to the 
collateral consequences rule, attorneys are constitutionally required to warn 
their clients about direct consequences of a guilty plea, which typically 
 
 1. 559 U.S. 356 (2010). 
 2. Id. at 360. 
 3. Id. at 373–75. 
 4. Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Jr., Effective Assistance of Counsel and the 
Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 697, 706–08 (2002). 
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relate to the nature of the criminal charge and sentencing.5  By contrast, 
attorneys are not required to warn their clients about collateral 
consequences, which are usually noncriminal in nature.6  Deportation, the 
consequence at issue in Padilla, was traditionally considered a collateral 
consequence of a guilty plea because it is a civil, not a criminal, 
consequence.7  Therefore, prior to Padilla, counsel was not constitutionally 
required to advise a criminal defendant of the deportation consequences of a 
guilty plea in most jurisdictions.  However, the Padilla Court created a 
categorical exception to the traditional rule:  in order to provide effective 
assistance of counsel, attorneys must warn criminal defendants when a 
guilty plea could result in deportation.8  To reach this conclusion, however, 
the Supreme Court refused to categorize deportation as either a direct or 
collateral consequence.  Instead, the Court focused on several features of 
immigration law that render it “intimately related to the criminal process.”9 
Lower courts have split regarding Padilla’s impact on the collateral 
consequences rule.10  Some courts, referred to in this Note as “no impact” 
courts, have held that Padilla is an outlier decision that has no impact on 
the traditional distinction between direct and collateral consequences.11  
These courts interpret Padilla’s holding to be limited to deportation.12  As a 
result, these no impact courts deny ineffective assistance of counsel claims 
based on counsel’s failure to warn of consequences traditionally considered 
to be collateral.13  However, other courts, referred to in this Note as 
“innovator” courts, have held that Padilla shifted the understanding of the 
direct and collateral consequences of a guilty plea for the purpose of an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim.14  Innovator courts have held that, 
after Padilla, some traditional collateral consequences must be considered 
direct under the existing collateral consequences rule.15 
This Note examines Padilla and the split it has caused in the lower courts 
where a defendant asserts an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based 
upon a traditional collateral consequence that stems automatically from a 
guilty plea, like deportation.16  Part I of this Note discusses the due process 
 
 5. See Jenny Roberts, The Mythical Divide Between Collateral and Direct 
Consequences of Criminal Convictions:  Involuntary Commitment of “Sexually Violent 
Predators,” 93 MINN. L. REV. 670, 678, 694 (2008). 
 6. See id. at 678, 694. 
 7. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez, 202 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 2000), abrogated by 
Padilla, 559 U.S. at 356; United States v. Del Rosario, 902 F.2d 55 (D.C. Cir. 1990), 
abrogated by Padilla, 559 U.S. at 356; United States v. Yearwood, 863 F.2d 6 (4th Cir. 
1988), abrogated by Padilla, 559 U.S. at 356. 
 8. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 374. 
 9. Id. at 365–66. 
 10. See infra Part II. 
 11. See infra Part II.A. 
 12. See infra Part II.A. 
 13. See infra Part II.A. 
 14. See infra Part II.B. 
 15. See infra Part II.B. 
 16. Courts have also considered Padilla’s impact on the direct versus collateral 
distinction when evaluating an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based upon a 
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and constitutional requirements for a valid guilty plea.  After a brief 
explanation of the collateral consequences rule and a historical summary of 
relevant immigration law, Part I also describes the Supreme Court’s opinion 
in Padilla, noting in particular the Court’s consideration of deportation as a 
harm warranting not only a duty to avoid giving incorrect advice, but also 
an affirmative duty to warn.  Part II presents the emerging split among 
lower courts regarding the impact of Padilla on the direct versus collateral 
distinction.  Finally, in Part III, this Note assesses the continued viability of 
the collateral consequences rule, and the relevance of Padilla to the 
ineffective assistance of counsel context.  This Note concludes that while 
the no impact courts are correct that Padilla did not eliminate the collateral 
consequences rule, decisions of the innovator courts suggest a better result:  
in light of the “unique nature of deportation” discussed in Padilla, courts 
should redefine the scope of direct consequences. 
I.  PADILLA IN CONTEXT:  INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, GUILTY 
PLEAS, AND THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES RULE 
Part I begins by providing an overview of the way in which courts 
evaluate the validity of a guilty plea.  It tracks the development of the 
collateral consequences rule, and the importation of that rule into the 
context of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  Next, this Part 
surveys the immigration law landscape leading up to, and providing the 
foundation for, the Supreme Court’s opinion in Padilla v. Kentucky.17  
Finally, this part presents the Supreme Court opinion in Padilla, and briefly 
 
traditional collateral consequence that, unlike deportation, does not stem automatically from 
a guilty plea. See, e.g., Bauder v. Dep’t of Corr., 619 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 2010) (evaluating 
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based upon failure to warn of the possibility of 
civil commitment); Maxwell v. Larkins, No. 4:08 CV 1896, 2010 WL 2680333 (E.D. Mo. 
July 1, 2010) (same); Brown v. Goodwin, Civil No. 09-211, 2010 WL 1930574 (D.N.J. May 
11, 2010) (same); People v. Hughes, 953 N.E.2d 1017 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011) (same); State v. 
Carter, No. 12-1938, 2013 WL 4769414 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 5, 2013) (same); Whipple v. 
State, No. A12-1713, 2013 WL 2372168 (Minn. Ct. App. June 3, 2013) (same); Thomas v. 
State, 365 S.W.3d 537 (Tex. Ct. App. 2012) (same); see also People v. Floyd, No. 
94K053487, 2012 WL 1414943 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. Apr. 13, 2012) (evaluating an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim based upon failure to warn of ineligibility for 
citizenship).  These decisions are outside the scope of this Note.  The consequences at issue 
in those cases present an additional variable—they operate differently than deportation.  In 
the context of civil commitment, for example, additional proceedings are warranted before a 
defendant is civilly committed because of his guilty plea. See, e.g., Brown, 2010 WL 
1930574, at *13 (“[Civil commitment] necessarily requires an individualized assessment of 
each person that might—but not must—be civilly committed upon expiration of his prison 
term . . . .”).  Therefore, in order to isolate the Padilla effect, this Note focuses only on 
traditional collateral consequences stemming automatically from a guilty plea, like 
deportation.  Furthermore, this Note is not intended to be a survey of all post-Padilla 
collateral consequences cases.  Discussion is limited to cases that provide an insightful 
analysis of the Padilla decision. 
 17. 559 U.S. 356 (2010). 
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summarizes the subsequent Kentucky Court of Appeals opinion on 
remand.18 
A.  Guilty Pleas, Due Process, and Effective Assistance of Counsel 
In order for a guilty plea to be valid, the defendant must enter the plea 
voluntarily and knowingly,19 and the defendant must receive effective 
assistance of counsel when deciding whether to accept the plea.20  This 
section discusses both requirements in order to demonstrate how courts 
imported the limiting test for a voluntary plea into the effective assistance 
of counsel context.  Part I.A.1 explains the origins of the “voluntary and 
knowing” requirement, and how judicial interpretation of that requirement 
led to the development of the collateral consequences rule.  Part I.A.2 tracks 
the incorporation of the collateral consequences rule into ineffective 
assistance of counsel jurisprudence. 
1.  Voluntary and Knowing:  The Development of the Collateral 
Consequences Rule 
When a defendant pleads guilty, he does more than admit he committed 
the offense—he also waives his Sixth Amendment right to a trial before a 
judge and jury.21  Therefore, in order for this waiver of rights to be valid 
under the Due Process Clause, the Supreme Court requires that the 
presiding judge ensure that the guilty plea is “voluntary” and “knowing.”22  
In Brady v. United States,23 the Supreme Court clarified the meaning of the 
“voluntariness” standard with respect to a guilty plea.24  In Brady, the 
Supreme Court held that a defendant makes a voluntary, and therefore 
valid, guilty plea if he is “fully aware of the direct consequences” of that 
plea.25  Lower courts have interpreted this language from Brady to require a 
judge to inform a defendant of the direct consequences of a guilty plea, but 
 
 18. Padilla v. Commonwealth, 381 S.W.3d 322 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012). 
 19. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970). 
 20. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56–57 (1985). 
 21. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury . . . .”); Brady, 397 U.S. at 748. 
 22. See STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
ADJUDICATIVE:  CASES AND COMMENTARY 1043 (8th ed. 2007) (discussing the “voluntary 
and knowing” requirements set out by the Supreme Court in McCarthy v. United States, 394 
U.S. 459 (1969), and Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969)). 
 23. Brady, 397 U.S. at 748. 
 24. Id. at 748. 
 25. Id. at 755 (“‘[A] plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct 
consequences, including the actual value of any commitments made to him by the court, 
prosecutor, or his own counsel, must stand unless induced by threats (or promises to 
discontinue improper harassment), misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or unfulfillable 
promises), or perhaps by promises that are by their nature improper as having no proper 
relationship to the prosecutor’s business (e.g. bribes).’” (quoting Shelton v. United States, 
246 F.2d 571, 572 n.2 (5th Cir. 1957), rev’d on other grounds, 356 U.S. 26 (1958))). 
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not the collateral consequences.26  This interpretation of Brady has been 
termed the “collateral consequences rule.”27 
While the Supreme Court has never expressly validated the rule,28 it is 
widely recognized by lower courts in the context of evaluating the validity 
of a guilty plea.29  Still, courts differ on how to define the distinction 
between direct and collateral consequences.30  The prevailing definition of a 
direct consequence31 is a consequence that is “definite, immediate, and 
largely automatic.”32  However, other courts distinguish direct 
consequences from collateral ones based on whether the particular 
consequence is punitive or nonpunitive in nature.33  A third definition limits 
the scope of direct consequences to those that remain within the control and 
responsibility of the sentencing court.34  Based on these three definitions, 
direct consequences typically relate to the nature of the charge and 
sentencing, whereas collateral consequences are usually noncriminal in 
nature.35 
Due to the narrow definition of direct consequences, very few are widely 
recognized.  The most commonly accepted direct consequences are prison 
terms, fines, and other criminal punishments imposed by the sentencing 
judge.36  If a presiding judge fails to warn a defendant of these 
consequences prior to the entry of a guilty plea, that plea is considered 
involuntary and unknowing.37  On the other hand, typical collateral 
consequences include, inter alia, mandatory sex offender registration,38 loss 
 
 26. See, e.g., United States v. Sambro, 454 F.2d 918, 922 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (“We 
presume that the Supreme Court meant what it said when it used the word ‘direct’; by doing 
so, it excluded collateral consequences.”); see also Jenny Roberts, Ignorance Is Effectively 
Bliss:  Collateral Consequences, Silence, and Misinformation in the Guilty-Plea Process, 95 
IOWA L. REV. 119, 124 (2009) (“Lower federal and state courts have created [the collateral 
consequences] rule, stating that an individual’s guilty plea is constitutionally valid even if 
that person was unaware of his conviction’s ‘collateral’ consequences.”). 
 27. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 26, at 124. 
 28. Id. at 132. 
 29. Chin & Holmes, supra note 4, at 730. But see Roberts, supra note 5, at 689 
(questioning the soundness of the presumption that the Supreme Court intended such a 
distinction). 
 30. See Roberts, supra note 5, at 689–93. 
 31. Id. at 689. 
 32. Cuthrell v. Dir., Patuxent Inst., 475 F.2d 1364, 1366 (4th Cir. 1973) (“The 
distinction between ‘direct’ and ‘collateral’ consequences of a plea . . . turns on whether the 
result represents a definite, immediate and largely automatic effect on the range of the 
defendant’s punishment.”). 
 33. Mitschke v. State, 129 S.W.3d 130, 136 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (holding that a trial 
court’s failure to warn of direct, but nonpunitive consequences of a guilty plea does not 
“violate due process or render [the] plea involuntary”). 
 34. El-Nobani v. United States, 287 F.3d 417, 421 (6th Cir. 2002) (“A collateral 
consequence is one that ‘remains beyond the control and responsibility of the district court in 
which that conviction was entered.’” (quoting United States v. Gonzalez, 202 F.3d 20, 27 
(1st Cir. 2000))). 
 35. See Roberts, supra note 5, at 678. 
 36. See id. at 672. 
 37. See Chin & Holmes, supra note 4, at 727. 
 38. See, e.g., Virsnieks v. Smith, 521 F.3d 707, 715–16 (7th Cir. 2008). 
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of the right to vote,39 loss of the right to own a gun,40 revocation of a 
driver’s license,41 and civil commitment as a sexually violent predator.42  
Additionally, prior to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Padilla,43 twelve 
circuits considered deportation a collateral consequence.44  Pursuant to the 
collateral consequences rule, a defendant’s plea remains knowing and 
voluntary—and, therefore, valid—even when a trial court fails to advise a 
criminal defendant of these consequences.45 
2.  Adoption of the Collateral Consequences Rule into the Realm of 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Jurisprudence 
In addition to the due process requirement of a voluntary and knowing 
plea, a defendant must also have had the effective assistance of counsel in 
deciding to enter the guilty plea.46  This requirement originated from the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel.47 
a.  The Sixth Amendment Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel 
The Sixth Amendment’s Assistance of Counsel Clause provides, “In all 
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . have the 
Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”48  In a long line of cases, the 
Supreme Court has established that a criminal defendant’s right to counsel 
is fundamentally important to a fair trial.49  The Court considered this right 
so important that it further held that the right to counsel includes the right to 
effective assistance of counsel.50  Two veins of ineffective assistance of 
 
 39. See, e.g., Ruelas v. Wolfenbarger, 580 F.3d 403, 408 (6th Cir. 2009); Meaton v. 
United States, 328 F.2d 379, 381 (5th Cir. 1964). 
 40. See, e.g., Ruelas, 580 F.3d at 408. 
 41. See, e.g., Moore v. Hinton, 513 F.2d 781, 782 (5th Cir. 1975). 
 42. See, e.g., George v. Black, 732 F.2d 108, 110 (8th Cir. 1984). 
 43. For a discussion of the Supreme Court’s characterization of deportation in Padilla, 
see infra Part I.C.2. 
 44. See, e.g., Broomes v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 1251, 1257 (10th Cir. 2004), abrogated by 
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010); El-Nobani v. United States, 287 F.3d 417, 421 
(6th Cir. 2002); United States v. Amador-Leal, 276 F.3d 511, 517 (9th Cir. 2002), abrogated 
by Padilla, 559 U.S. at 356; United States v. Gonzalez, 202 F.3d 20, 25 (1st Cir. 2000), 
abrogated by Padilla, 559 U.S. at 356; United States v. Osiemi, 980 F.2d 344, 349 (5th Cir. 
1993); Kandiel v. United States, 964 F.2d 794, 796 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. 
Montoya, 891 F.2d 1273, 1292–93 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Romero-Vilca, 850 F.2d 
177, 179 (3d Cir. 1988); United States v. Campbell, 778 F.2d 764, 767 (11th Cir. 1985), 
abrogated by Padilla, 559 U.S. at 356; Michel v. United States, 507 F.2d 461, 464–66 (2d 
Cir. 1974); Cuthrell v. Dir., Patuxent Inst., 475 F.2d 1364, 1366 (4th Cir. 1973); United 
States v. Sambro, 454 F.2d 918, 922–23 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
 45. See, e.g., Warren v. Richland Cnty. Cir. Ct., 223 F.3d 454, 458 (7th Cir. 2000); 
Brown v. Perini, 718 F.2d 784, 784 (6th Cir. 1983). 
 46. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985). 
 47. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684–85 (1984). 
 48. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 49. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 
(1938); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
 50. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970). 
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counsel exist.  The first vein concerns government interference with the 
way counsel conducts his defense.51  The second vein concerns defense 
counsel’s actual ineffectiveness by failing to provide “adequate legal 
assistance.”52  This Note—and the direct and collateral distinction—is 
concerned with the latter vein. 
Until 1984, the Supreme Court had not fully articulated a constitutional 
standard regarding the actual effectiveness required of counsel’s 
assistance.53  With its decision in Strickland v. Washington, the Supreme 
Court articulated a two-part test that has since been used to evaluate 
whether a counsel’s actual assistance in a criminal case satisfies the Sixth 
Amendment.54  This two-part test is meant to ensure a fair trial.55 
b.  Creation and Extension of the Strickland Test 
In order to advance a successful ineffective assistance of counsel claim, 
the Strickland test requires that a defendant show first that “counsel’s 
performance was deficient,” and second that “the deficient performance 
prejudiced the defense.”56  The Strickland Court provided numerous 
examples of attorney behavior that could qualify as ineffective assistance.57  
However, the Court made clear that “these basic duties neither exhaustively 
define[d] the obligations of counsel nor form[ed] a checklist for judicial 
evaluation of attorney performance.”58  Instead, “[r]easonable professional 
judgment” remained the overarching standard.59  The Strickland Court 
stressed that bright-line rules for ineffective assistance of counsel claims 
were inappropriate,60 and indicated that courts should evaluate ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims on a case-by-case basis.61 
 
 51. See, e.g., Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80 (1976) (barring attorney-client 
consultation); Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853 (1975) (barring defense counsel’s 
summation at trial).  This type of ineffective assistance of counsel is beyond the scope of this 
Note. 
 52. See, e.g., Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344 (1980).  For the purposes of this 
Note, discussion of ineffective assistance of counsel refers to the second vein—an attorney’s 
failure to provide “adequate legal assistance.” 
 53. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). 
 54. Id. at 687. 
 55. Id.  The proceeding at issue in Strickland was a capital sentencing proceeding, but 
the Court declared that of little import.  The same principles of ensuring a fair trial and 
producing a just result applied to a capital sentencing proceeding just as they applied to a 
bench trial. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 688 (finding that counsel has a duty of loyalty, to avoid conflicts of interest, to 
advocate the defendant’s cause, to help the defendant make important decisions, to keep 
defendant informed of developments in his case, and to use skill and knowledge to produce a 
reliable trial). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 690. 
 60. Chin & Holmes, supra note 4, at 711. 
 61. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 693 (noting that “[m]ore specific guidelines are not 
appropriate” because “[r]epresentation is an art, and an act or omission that is unprofessional 
in one case may be sound or even brilliant in another”).  This language prompted Chin and 
Holmes to criticize the lower courts’ adoption of the collateral consequences rule in the 
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Just one year after Strickland, the Supreme Court extended application of 
the Strickland test to pretrial proceedings in Hill v. Lockhart.62  The Court 
held that “the two-part Strickland v. Washington test applies to challenges 
to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel.”63  For purposes 
of proving ineffective assistance of counsel in the plea context, the first 
prong of Strickland remained identical to the standard that applied in the 
trial or sentencing context.64  However, in order to satisfy the “prejudice” 
prong of Strickland in the plea context, defendants must “show that there is 
a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have 
pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.”65 
c.  Adoption of the Collateral Consequences Rule into the 
Strickland Analysis 
The Strickland standard of “reasonable professional assistance” did not 
provide a bright-line rule for lower courts to apply when facing an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  However, lower courts needed a 
way to define the scope of “reasonable professional assistance” in the 
context of a guilty plea.66  Therefore, these courts imported the distinction 
between direct and collateral consequences from the due process context.  
The general rule is that an attorney’s performance is considered 
constitutionally deficient if he fails to advise a defendant of the direct 
consequences of entering a guilty plea.67  By contrast, an attorney can 
provide constitutionally adequate assistance without warning a defendant 
about collateral consequences of a guilty plea.68 
 
effective assistance of counsel context as running contrary to the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Strickland.  See Chin & Holmes, supra note 4, at 709–12. 
 62. 474 U.S. 52 (1985). 
 63. Id. at 58. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 59. 
 66. See Roberts, supra note 26, at 124. 
 67. See id. 
 68. Roberts, supra note 5, at 694.  Some jurisdictions recognize an exception to this rule, 
where defense counsel provides affirmative misadvice regarding a collateral consequence of 
a guilty plea. See, e.g., Sparks v. Sowders, 852 F.2d 882, 885 (6th Cir. 1988) (“[G]ross 
misadvice concerning [a collateral consequence] can amount to ineffective assistance of 
counsel.”); Strader v. Garrison, 611 F.2d 61, 65 (4th Cir. 1979) (“[W]hen [a defendant] is 
grossly misinformed about [a collateral consequence] by his lawyer, and relies upon that 
misinformation, he is deprived of his constitutional right to counsel.”).  A circuit court has 
never held that affirmative misadvice concerning a collateral consequence of a guilty plea 
cannot result in ineffective assistance under any circumstances. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 
U.S. 356, 386–87 (Alito, J., concurring). But see Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482, 
485 (Ky. 2008), rev’d, 559 U.S. at 356 (holding that the defense counsel’s mistaken advice 
to his client about the potential deportation consequences of a guilty plea provided no basis 
for vacating the defendant’s sentence); but see also Padilla, 559 U.S. at 388–89 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (“[A]ffirmative misadvice [does not] render[] an attorney’s assistance in 
defending against the prosecution constitutionally inadequate.”).  One major issue with the 
affirmative misadvice exception is that it creates a “perverse incentive . . . [to] say nothing at 
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Almost every lower court uses the collateral consequences rule to 
evaluate an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.69  Three versions of the 
rule have emerged.70  At one extreme, the Kentucky approach, used by the 
Supreme Court of Kentucky in Padilla, finds both collateral consequences 
and affirmative misadvice regarding those collateral consequences outside 
the scope of the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.71  
Under this approach, counsel’s performance is constitutionally adequate 
whether he fails to advise or misadvises the defendant of collateral 
consequences of a proffered guilty plea. 
At the opposite end of the spectrum, the New Mexico approach imposes 
an affirmative duty of accurate advice regarding direct and some collateral 
consequences.72  New Mexico courts require an attorney to accurately 
advise a client about a guilty plea consequence when it would be 
unreasonable to withhold that advice.73 
Finally, the majority approach, standing on middle ground, accepts the 
traditional collateral consequences rule and the affirmative misadvice 
exception.74  Under this approach, counsel’s performance is constitutionally 
adequate where he fails to advise the defendant of the collateral 
consequences of a guilty plea, but falls short of the constitutional standard 
where he provides affirmative misadvice regarding a collateral 
consequence.75  The Supreme Court has never approved any version of the 
collateral consequences rule in the ineffective assistance of counsel 
context.76 
B.  The Immigration Foundations of Padilla v. Kentucky:  
The Criminalization of Immigration Law 
The Supreme Court began its decision in Padilla with an overview of the 
changes in immigration law over the last ninety years.77  The Court 
 
all about ‘collateral’ matters.” Roberts, supra note 26, at 119.  “Judicial decisions that 
incorporate the collateral-consequences rule and affirmative-misdavice exception deliver the 
following message to lawyers and judges:  it is better to say nothing than take the risk of 
saying something wrong . . . .” Id. at 140. 
 69. Chin & Holmes, supra note 4, at 706.  For a discussion of the varying versions of the 
collateral consequences rule applied to immigration consequences prior to Padilla, see 
Maurice Hew, Jr., Under the Circumstances:  Padilla v. Kentucky Still Excuses Fundamental 
Fairness and Leaves Professional Responsibility Lost, 32 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 31, 38–40 
(2012). 
 70. Roberts, supra note 26, at 177. 
 71. Id. at 177; see also Hew, supra note 69, at 40. 
 72. Roberts, supra note 26, at 177. 
 73. Id.; see, e.g., State v. Paredez, 101 P.3d 799, 804 (N.M. 2004). 
 74. Roberts, supra note 26, at 177.  This approach was used by the Kentucky Court of 
Appeals in Padilla. Hew, supra note 69, at 40. 
 75. Roberts, supra note 26, at 177. 
 76. Peter L. Markowitz, Deportation Is Different, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1299, 1337 
(2011). 
 77. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 360–61 (2010). 
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concluded that “these changes . . . have dramatically raised the stakes of a 
noncitizen’s criminal conviction.”78  This section surveys relevant changes 
in federal immigration law to introduce the immigration concerns 
underlying the Padilla decision. 
1.  Statutorily Raising the Stakes of Deportation 
The first federal laws governing deportation of aliens did not appear until 
the late 1880s.79  Grounds for deportation were limited under these laws, 
and typically included conditions existing at or prior to entry into the 
United States.80 
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 191781 (1917 Act) “radically 
changed prior law”82 and linked criminal law to deportation for the first 
time.83  The 1917 Act, which solidified restrictive immigration policy,84 
was the first congressional act to make classes of aliens deportable based on 
criminal conduct committed in the United States.85  However, the 1917 Act 
did not call for automatic deportation of aliens guilty of certain offenses.86  
Instead, it allowed judges the discretion to issue a judicial recommendation 
against deportation (JRAD), which bound the executive branch to prevent 
deportation.87  Additionally, the Immigration and Naturalization Service 
(INS) held that section 3 of the 1917 Act permitted relief in deportation 
proceedings for aliens who had departed and returned to the United States 
after the grounds for deportation arose.88  In the years after the 1917 Act, 
 
 78. Id. at 364. 
 79. Juliet Stumpf, Fitting Punishment, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1683, 1712 (2009).  
Prior to 1875, regulation of immigration was left largely to the states. See generally Gerald 
L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law (1776–1875), 93 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1833 (1993) (reviewing state immigration laws between 1776 and 1875).  In 1875, 
Congress enacted the first immigration legislation. See Immigration Act of Aug. 3, 1882, ch. 
376, 22 Stat. 214 (repealed 1974) (excluding “convict[s], lunatic[s], idiot[s], or any person 
unable to take care of himself or herself”); see also Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, ch. 126, 
22 Stat. 58 (repealed 1943) (prohibiting, inter alia, Chinese laborers from entering the United 
States).  This legislation dealt largely with excluding aliens but not with deportation of aliens 
already admitted to the United States. 
 80. Stumpf, supra note 79, at 1712.  Unlawful entry was the primary ground for 
deportation under these provisions. Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodriguez, The President 
and Immigration Law, 119 YALE L.J. 458, 514 (2009). 
 81. Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874 (repealed 1952). 
 82. DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION 133 (2007). 
 83. Id. at 133–34. 
 84. STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRIGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE 
LAW AND POLICY 15 (5th ed. 2009). 
 85. S. REP. NO. 81-1515, at 54–55 (1950).  Under the 1917 Act, advocating anarchy and 
crimes of “moral turpitude” made an alien eligible for deportation. Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 
29, 39 Stat. at 889. 
 86. See 6 CHARLES GORDON & STANLEY MAILMAN, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE 
§ 71.05[1][e][ii] (2012). 
 87. Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, 39 Stat. at 889–90; see 6 GORDON & MAILMAN, supra 
note 86, § 71.05[1][e][ii]. 
 88. See, e.g., In re L, 1 I. & N. Dec. 1, 2 (BIA 1940). 
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Congress continued to broaden the scope of criminal offenses triggering 
deportation.89 
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 195290 (INA) was the next major 
overhaul of federal immigration legislation, and is considered the 
“backbone of contemporary immigration law.”91  The INA consolidated 
prior immigration legislation92 and further solidified the link between 
immigration and criminal law by again expanding the categories of criminal 
offenses triggering deportation.93  The INA also eliminated the availability 
of JRAD discretionary relief for aliens who had committed narcotics 
offenses.94  However, aliens could obtain relief through suspension of 
deportation, voluntary departure, adjustment of status, or stay of 
deportation.95  Aliens commonly invoked these defenses as a basis for 
remaining in the United States.96  Further, prior to 1996, section 212 of the 
INA allowed the Attorney General broad discretion to grant deportation 
waivers.97 
 
 89. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 4, 1929, ch. 690, 45 Stat. 1551 (repealed 1952).  The 1929 Act 
subjected aliens convicted of any offense and sentenced to two or more years in prison to 
deportation. Stumpf, supra note 79, at 1717; see also Alien Registration Act of 1940, ch. 
439, § 23, 54 Stat. 670, 673 (repealed 1952).  This Act made deportation the leading 
immigration sanction and further linked criminal law to immigration by expanding the 
grounds for deportation to additional classes of offenses. Stumpf, supra note 79, at 1716–17.  
However, the 1940 Act still provided aliens an avenue of relief, bestowing discretion upon 
the Attorney General to suspend deportation for aliens of good moral character when 
deportation would cause an economic hardship to the noncitizen’s family. Alien Registration 
Act of 1940, ch. 439, sec. 20, § 19(c), 54 Stat. at 672. 
 90. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, and 22 U.S.C.). 
 91. Keith Aoki & John Shuford, Welcome to Amerizona—Immigrants Out!:  Assessing 
“Dystopian Dreams” and “Usable Futures” of Immigration Reform, and Considering 
Whether “Immigration Regionalism” Is an Idea Whose Time Has Come, 38 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 1, 60 (2010). 
 92. LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 84, at 17. 
 93. Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 80, at 515. 
 94. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 362–63 (2010); see also United States v. 
O’Rourke, 213 F.2d 759, 762 (8th Cir. 1954) (recognizing that aliens who had committed a 
narcotics offense were no longer eligible for a JRAD under the 1952 Act).  In 1990, 
Congress retroactively eliminated the JRAD form of relief in its entirety. Immigration Act of 
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 505, 104 Stat. 4978, 5050 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1251(b) 
(1990)) (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2006)); see also KANSTROOM, supra note 82, at 
228. 
 95. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, §§ 244–245, 66 Stat. at 214–17; see also 
1 GORDON & MAILMAN, supra note 86, § 2.03[2][g].  In 1996, Congress replaced these 
avenues of relief with cancellation of removal. See 1 GORDON & MAILMAN, supra note 86, 
§ 2.04[14][c]. 
 96. See, e.g., Akram v. Holder, 721 F.3d 853, 856–57 (7th Cir. 2013). 
 97. That section of the INA provided:  “Aliens lawfully admitted for permanent 
residence who temporarily proceeded abroad voluntarily and not under an order of 
deportation, and who are returning to a lawful unrelinquished domicile of seven consecutive 
years, may be admitted in the discretion of the Attorney General.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) 
(1994), repealed by Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 
Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-597.  Although this provision expressly 
applied only to exclusion proceedings, the Board of Immigration Appeals interpreted it to 
 
1420 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
In 1996, Congress made another significant contribution to existing 
immigration legislation.98  The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act of 199699 (AEDPA) and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of 1996100 (IIRIRA) broadened the scope of deportable 
offenses101 and narrowed the scope of judicial review102 of deportation 
matters.  The AEDPA and IIRIRA also curtailed the availability of 
deportation waivers from the Attorney General.  Section 440(d) of the 
AEDPA identified a broad set of offenses for which convictions would 
make an alien ineligible for discretionary waiver relief.103  Section 304(b) 
of IIRIRA repealed section 212(c) of the INA,104 replacing it with the more 
narrow cancellation of removal provision.105 
2.  Judicial Action in the Realm of Immigration Law 
The text of the U.S. Constitution does not provide Congress the power to 
regulate immigration.106  It was, therefore, left to the Supreme Court to 
articulate such a source of power.107  The Court first did so in 1889 with the 
creation of the plenary powers doctrine in the context of exclusion.108  The 
plenary powers doctrine left aliens largely at the mercy of the executive and 
 
allow the Attorney General broad discretion in deportation matters as well. See In re Silva, 
16 I. & N. Dec. 26, 30 (BIA 1976). 
 98. 5 GORDON & MAILMAN, supra note 86, § 64.01[1]; 1 id. § 2.04[14][b]. 
 99. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214; see also LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 
84, at 21. 
 100. 110 Stat. at 3009-546.  IIRIRA consolidated exclusion and deportation proceedings 
into “removal” proceedings. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(3) (2006).  IIRIRA also further restricted 
the availability of discretionary relief from deportation and purported to exempt certain 
immigration decisions from judicial review. LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 84, at 22. 
 101. See 1 GORDON & MAILMAN, supra note 86, § 2.04[14][b][vi], [14][c]. 
 102. See KANSTROOM, supra note 82, at 229. 
 103. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 110 Stat. at 1277 (amending 
8 U.S.C. § 1182(c)). 
 104. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 110 Stat. at 
3009-597; see also supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
 105. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 110 Stat. at 
3009-594 (creating 8 U.S.C. § 1229b).  This provision gives the Attorney General discretion 
to cancel removal for only a narrow class of aliens.  Those excluded were any aliens 
previously “convicted of any aggravated felony.” Id. 
 106. Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 80, at 466. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).  Prior to 1996, exclusion 
referred to the refusal to allow a noncitizen entry into the United States. See 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(b) (repealed 1996); see also Markowitz, supra note 76, at 1307 n.31.  By contrast, 
deportation referred to the removal of a noncitizen who has entered the United States, legally 
or illegally. THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP:  
PROCESS AND POLICY 693 (6th ed. 2008).  Currently, the distinction between deportation and 
exclusion (now referred to as inadmissibility) turns on whether the noncitizen is seeking 
admission to the United States or has already been legally admitted. Id. at 508. 
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Congress.109  The Supreme Court also found that inherent sovereign power 
existed over exclusion.110  Therefore, the constitutional protections afforded 
to criminal proceedings were not available in exclusion proceedings.111  
Four years later, the Supreme Court applied the plenary powers doctrine in 
the context of deportation.112  Using the same reasoning employed in the 
context of exclusion, the Court held that the constitutional safeguards of 
criminal law are not applicable to deportation proceedings.113  The Court 
also characterized deportation as a civil matter for the first time.114  This 
label is significant because “civil” matters do not merit the same thorough 
procedural review as criminal matters.115  In 1903, however, the Court 
extended some protections to immigration matters, holding that an alien is 
entitled to due process of law in deportation proceedings.116 
Under the classic plenary powers doctrine, judicial review is narrowly 
circumscribed in the immigration context.117  While certain cases prove this 
to be true,118 scholars have observed that beginning in the 1940s, courts 
began to circumvent the classic doctrine through techniques of statutory 
interpretation.119  Courts taking this approach often noted the harshness of 
 
 109. The doctrine bestows upon Congress and the executive broad and largely exclusive 
authority on immigration matters. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 711 
(1893) (asserting that the power to deport is “an inherent and inalienable right of every 
sovereign and independent nation, essential to its safety, its independence and its welfare”). 
 110. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 609. 
 111. See id. at 606.  The Court’s decision was unclear as to whether this holding would 
also apply to deportation. Markowitz, supra note 76, at 1311. 
 112. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 730. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id.  In 1913, the Supreme Court explicitly determined that deportation was not a 
criminal punishment. Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 591 (1913).  Courts continued to 
label deportation as “civil,” but expressed discomfort with that label because of the severity 
of the consequence. See, e.g., Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 594 (1952) 
(questioning, but refusing to reconsider, the “civil” label of deportation); Fong Haw Tan v. 
Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948) (noting that deportation is a “drastic measure”); Delgadillo v. 
Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388, 391 (1947) (emphasizing the “high and momentous” stakes in 
deportation proceedings); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945) (referring to the 
impact of a deportation order as a “great hardship”). 
 115. See Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law:  Procedural 
Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625, 1632 (1992).  
However, scholars have suggested that immigration is no longer properly classified as 
completely civil or completely criminal. See generally Kris Kobach, The Quintessential 
Force Multiplier:  The Inherent Authority of Local Police To Make Immigration Arrests, 69 
ALB. L. REV. 179, 223 (2005) (“The overlap between civil and criminal provisions of 
immigration law is also demonstrated by the many actions in the immigration arena that 
trigger both civil and criminal penalties.”); Markowitz, supra note 76. 
 116. Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1903). 
 117. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950) 
(finding that Knauff’s exclusion without a hearing was “reasonable” as required by the 1941 
Act because “[w]hatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as 
an alien denied entry is concerned”). 
 118. See, e.g., Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953). 
 119. See Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power:  
Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 567–74 
(1990).  Motomura describes this phenomenon as “phantom norm decisionmaking.” Id. at 
567. 
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the deportation consequence.120  Dissenters from opinions adhering to the 
classic plenary powers doctrine argued that deportation really constituted a 
punishment.121 
These cases and the statutes discussed in the prior section demonstrate 
the dialogue between Congress and the Supreme Court regarding 
immigration law, specifically deportation.  The increasing availability of 
deportation as a consequence for criminal activity,122 coupled with judicial 
concern about the harshness of the consequences of deportation,123 laid the 
foundation for the Supreme Court’s decision in Padilla v. Kentucky.124  The 
next section provides a discussion of the majority, concurring, and 
dissenting opinions in Padilla. 
C.  Padilla v. Kentucky:  A Change in the Landscape of 
Collateral Consequences 
The U.S. Supreme Court held in Padilla v. Kentucky that defense 
counsel’s inaccurate advice regarding the deportation consequences of the 
defendant’s guilty plea constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.  This 
section describes the Supreme Court’s majority decision in Padilla, the 
concurring and dissenting opinions in Padilla, and briefly mentions the 
subsequent decision of the Kentucky Court of Appeals on remand. 
1.  Jose Padilla’s Path to the Supreme Court 
Jose Padilla, a Honduras native, had been a lawful permanent resident of 
the United States for over forty years.125  While in the United States, Padilla 
served in the armed forces with honor during the Vietnam War.126  Prior to 
his conviction, Padilla resided in California with his wife, three children, 
 
 120. See, e.g., Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948) (“[D]eportation is a drastic 
measure and at times the equivalent of banishment or exile.”); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 
135, 154 (1945) (“Though deportation is not technically a criminal proceeding, it visits a 
great hardship on the individual . . . .”); see also INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 300, 304 
(2001) (refusing to interpret a statute in a manner that would entirely preclude judicial 
review because of the “difficult and significant” constitutional questions such an 
interpretation would raise); Markowitz, supra note 76, at 1301–02 (noting the “gravity of the 
liberty deprivation at issue” in deportation proceedings and providing examples of the harsh 
consequences of deportation). 
 121. See, e.g., Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 320 (1955) (Douglas, J., dissenting) 
(“Deportation may be as severe a punishment as loss of livelihood.”); Harisiades v. 
Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 600 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“Banishment [by 
deportation] is punishment in the practical sense.”); United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253, 
269 (1905) (Brewer, J., dissenting) (“[D]eportation . . . is always considered a 
punishment.”); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 740 (1893) (Brewer, J., 
dissenting) (“Deportation is punishment.”). 
 122. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 123. See supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
 124. 559 U.S. 356 (2010) (holding that a noncitizen has the right to effective assistance of 
counsel when entering a guilty plea and that that right requires defense counsel to warn a 
noncitizen of the deportation consequences of the plea). 
 125. Id. at 359. 
 126. Id. 
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and an elderly mother-in-law.127  Padilla worked as a “self-employed 
tractor-trailer owner.”128  While driving a truck route from California to 
Illinois and Michigan, Padilla stopped at a weigh station in Kentucky.129  
While at the weigh station, Padilla consented to a search of his truck cab.  
This search revealed a substantial amount of marijuana.130  Padilla’s case 
was prosecuted in Kentucky state court.  Although he testified that he did 
not know that he was transporting marijuana until the search, Padilla pled 
guilty to “various marijuana-related charges, including trafficking in more 
than five pounds of marijuana.”131  This offense is a deportable offense 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).132  However, Padilla relied upon his 
counsel’s advice that he “did not have to worry about immigration status 
since he had been in the country so long.”133  Padilla was sentenced to five 
years in prison with five years probation.134  While in prison, Padilla was 
served with an immigration detainer,135 which meant that after his release 
from prison, Padilla faced “virtually mandatory” deportation.136 
Padilla appealed to the Kentucky Supreme Court for postconviction 
relief.  He asserted that he would have gone to trial had his lawyer warned 
him of the deportation consequences of his guilty plea.137  The Kentucky 
Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment guarantee of effective 
assistance of counsel did not protect Padilla from erroneous advice about 
deportation, because it was merely a collateral consequence of his 
conviction.138  Thus, the Kentucky Supreme Court denied relief without an 
evidentiary hearing.139  Padilla appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.  The 
Court granted certiorari to decide “whether, as a matter of federal law, 
Padilla’s counsel had an obligation to advise him that the offense to which 
he was pleading guilty would result in his removal from this country.”140 
The Supreme Court reversed Padilla’s conviction in a seven-to-two vote.  
Justice Stevens delivered the majority opinion.  Justice Alito authored a 
concurring opinion in which Chief Justice Roberts joined, and Justice 
Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, dissented.  The next sections review each 
opinion. 
 
 127. Padilla v. Commonwealth, 381 S.W.3d 322, 324 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012). 
 128. Id. at 327. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 324. 
 132. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 359 n.1 (2010). 
 133. Commonwealth v. Padilla, 253 S.W.3d 482, 483 (Ky. 2008), rev’d, 559 U.S. at 356. 
 134. Padilla, 381 S.W.3d at 483. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 359. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 359–60. 
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2.  The Supreme Court Majority 
After an exegesis on immigration law, the Court embarked on a doctrinal 
discussion of Padilla’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim.141  The 
Court acknowledged the collateral consequences rule used by lower courts, 
including the Kentucky Supreme Court, to evaluate a Strickland claim.142  
The Court also acknowledged that removal proceedings are “civil in 
nature.”143  However, the Court noted that it had never applied the collateral 
consequences rule, and explicitly refused to do so in Padilla.144  The Court 
also did not discuss whether the rule was appropriate in the context of 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims.145  Instead, the Court focused on 
the “unique nature of deportation,” which made it difficult to classify as 
either a direct or collateral consequence.146  The Court pointed to several 
factors to support this conclusion.  First, although deportation proceedings 
are civil in nature, deportation is a “particularly severe ‘penalty’” with a 
nearly automatic result.147  Further, the deportation penalty is so intimately 
related to the criminal conviction that it is “‘difficult’ to divorce the penalty 
from the conviction in the deportation context.”148  Finally, the Court noted 
the particular severity of deportation.149  Based on these factors, the 
Supreme Court concluded that “advice regarding deportation is not 
categorically removed from the ambit of the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel.  Strickland applies to Padilla’s claim.”150 
Having determined that advice regarding the deportation consequences of 
a guilty plea falls within the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance 
of counsel, the Court applied the Strickland test.  The Court determined that 
the “weight of prevailing professional norms,” along with the clarity of the 
immigration statute mandating deportation,151 supports the conclusion that 
Padilla’s counsel was constitutionally deficient in misadvising him of the 
deportation consequences of his guilty plea.152  The Supreme Court 
therefore held that, in order to provide effective assistance of counsel, an 
attorney is required to advise his client of the immigration consequences of 
 
 141. Id. at 364. 
 142. Id. at 364–65. 
 143. Id. at 365. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 365–66. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id.  The Court noted that this is due to the “recent changes in . . . immigration law 
[that] have made removal nearly an automatic result for a broad class of noncitizen 
offenders.” Id. at 366.  For an overview of these recent changes, see supra Part I.B.1. 
 149. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 365 (citing Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 740 
(1893)). 
 150. Id. at 366. 
 151. Id. at 367.  For situations where the law is not as clear or succinct as the removal 
statute at issue in Padilla, the Supreme Court limited counsel’s duty to merely providing 
notice of a potential adverse consequence of a guilty plea. Id. at 369 & n.10. 
 152. Id. at 366–69. 
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a guilty plea,153 or, where it is unclear whether a guilty plea will result in 
deportation, give notice to his client of the potential for immigration 
consequences.154 
The Supreme Court did not limit the holding of Padilla to instances of 
inaccurate advice.  The Court further held that Strickland would apply to 
Padilla’s claim whether he received incorrect advice or no advice at all 
regarding the deportation consequences of his plea.155  Having established 
that Padilla’s counsel provided constitutionally deficient assistance, the 
U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Kentucky Supreme Court and remanded 
the case for a determination of whether Padilla suffered prejudice under the 
second prong of Strickland.156  On remand, the Kentucky Court of Appeals 
found that Padilla had demonstrated prejudice under Strickland,157 and 
remanded the case to the Hardin Circuit Court to vacate Padilla’s judgment 
and conviction.158 
3.  The Concurring Opinion of Justice Alito 
Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, concurred in the result but 
wrote separately to address concerns that the majority’s opinion “marks a 
major upheaval in Sixth Amendment law.”159  Contrary to the majority’s 
opinion, Justice Alito would have affirmed the collateral consequences 
rule,160 and limited Sixth Amendment protections to situations involving 
inaccurate advice.161  Justice Alito concurred in the result because, in his 
view, Padilla’s case fell under the affirmative misadvice exception—
Padilla’s counsel erroneously advised him that he did not have to worry 
about deportation consequences when pleading guilty.162  Justice Alito 
pointed out that to hold otherwise would be to hold contrary to every 
federal court of appeals that had considered the issue.163 
Still, for Justice Alito, silence alone would not be enough to satisfy a 
counsel’s duty to provide effective assistance.164 Notice of potential 
 
 153. Id. at 368.  This requirement is sometimes referred to as the “Padilla advisory.” 
Margaret Colgate Love & Gabriel J. Chin, Padilla v. Kentucky:  The Right to Counsel and 
the Collateral Consequences of Conviction, CHAMPION, May 2010, at 18, 19.  Justice Scalia 
also referred to a “Padilla warning” in dissent. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 1496 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
 154. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 369. 
 155. Id. at 370 (“[T]here is no relevant difference between an act of commission and an 
act of omission.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 690 (1984))). 
 156. Id. at 374–75. 
 157. Padilla v. Commonwealth, 381 S.W.3d 322, 330 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012). 
 158. Id. at 330–31. 
 159. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 383 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 160. Id.  For a discussion of the justifications of the collateral consequences rule provided 
by Justice Alito, see infra Part I.D. 
 161. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 375–76.  This follows most closely the majority approach to the 
collateral consequences rule. See supra notes 74–75 and accompanying text. 
 162. See Padilla, 559 U.S. at 375–76. 
 163. Id. at 383. 
 164. Id. at 387–88. 
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consequences must also be provided.165  Specific to the immigration 
context, Justice Alito advocated a bright-line rule requiring a defense 
attorney who is aware that his client is an alien to “(1) refrain from 
unreasonably providing incorrect advice and (2) advise the defendant that a 
criminal conviction may have adverse immigration consequences and that, 
if the alien wants advice on this issue, the alien should consult an 
immigration attorney.”166  Justice Alito provided two justifications for this 
rule.  First, immigration is a “specialized field” in which criminal defense 
attorneys do not have expertise and should not be doling out misinformed 
advice.167  Second, by putting a client on notice that he may be subject to 
deportation, a defense attorney reduces the risk that a client would enter an 
uninformed or misinformed guilty plea.168 
The principle of stare decisis drove Justice Alito’s concurrence.169  
However, the requirement of some form of notice of a potential collateral 
consequence, such as deportation, still does not fall squarely within one of 
the three commonly accepted versions of the collateral consequences 
rule.170  It does, however, address concerns that the collateral consequences 
rule provides a perverse incentive for attorneys to remain silent on collateral 
consequences.171 
4.  Justice Scalia’s Dissent 
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, dissented, accusing the majority 
of “swinging a sledge where a tack hammer is needed.”172  Justice Scalia 
would have preserved the traditional collateral consequences rule.173  
Unlike the concurrence, however, Justice Scalia would have also excluded 
inaccurate advice regarding collateral consequences from Sixth Amendment 
protections.174  Accordingly, Justice Scalia would have held that Padilla’s 
Sixth Amendment challenge had no merit because he only received 
inaccurate advice about a collateral consequence of his guilty plea.175  
Under a proper textual reading, Justice Scalia reasoned, no other result 
could be reached.176 
 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 375.  Justice Alito found the majority’s distinction between clear and unclear 
consequences unworkable because it would result in confusion among attorneys. Id.  For a 
discussion of the majority’s distinction between clear and unclear consequences, see supra 
note 151 and accompanying text. 
 167. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 388. 
 168. Id. 
 169. See id. at 382–84. 
 170. See supra Part I.A.2.c. 
 171. See supra note 68. 
 172. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 388 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 173. Id. at 388–89. 
 174. Id. at 387–88.  This stance aligns the dissent with the Kentucky approach to the 
collateral consequences rule. See supra Part I.A.2.c. 
 175. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 387–88. 
 176. See id. at 389–90. 
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Justice Scalia joined the concurrence’s adherence to the collateral 
consequences rule based on the principle of stare decisis,177 and on a textual 
reading of the Constitution.178  However, he departs from Justice Alito’s 
reasoning with respect to instances of affirmative misadvice regarding a 
collateral consequence.179  Instead, Justice Scalia stresses that the same 
floodgates issue that prompts the concurrence to advocate retaining the 
collateral consequences rule also warrants elimination of the affirmative 
misadvice exception and the notice requirement for deportation 
consequences.180  Instead, Justice Scalia suggests that a statutory solution 
would be most appropriate.181  He envisions legislation that “could specify 
which categories of misadvice about matters ancillary to the prosecution 
invalidate plea agreements, what collateral consequences counsel must 
bring to a defendant’s attention, and what warnings must be given.”182 
D.  Justification for and Criticism of Application of the Collateral 
Consequences Rule to Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims 
The varying treatment of the collateral consequences rule in the three 
Padilla opinions discussed above demonstrates that the state of the rule is in 
flux.  This section presents existing criticisms of and justifications for the 
collateral consequences rule to frame the conflict among lower courts 
discussed in Part II, infra. 
Borrowed from a different but related context, the collateral 
consequences rule has been subject to significant criticism.  Critics have 
asserted that the rule is doctrinally flawed because, as a bright-line rule, it 
contradicts the Strickland mandate that ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims must be evaluated by an “objective standard of reasonableness.”183  
Additionally, one fundamental purpose of the right to effective assistance of 
counsel is to ensure that a criminal defendant makes a voluntary and 
knowing plea under Brady.184  One critic points out that it is difficult to 
understand how a plea could be fully voluntary and knowing without 
knowledge of the collateral consequences of that plea.185  Similarly, other 
 
 177. Id. at 390 (“[W]e [have never] required advice of counsel regarding consequences 
collateral to prosecution.”). 
 178. Id. (“There is no basis in text or in principle to extend the constitutionally required 
advice regarding guilty pleas beyond those matters germane to the criminal prosecution at 
hand—to wit, the sentence that the plea will produce, the higher sentence that conviction 
after trial might entail, and the chances of such a conviction.”). 
 179. Id. at 391. 
 180. Id. at 390–91 (“[A]n obligation to advise about a conviction’s collateral 
consequences has no logical stopping-point. . . .  [I]t seems . . . that the concurrence suffers 
from the same . . . indeterminacy, the same inability to know what areas of advice are 
relevant, attaches to misadvice.”). 
 181. Id. at 392. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Roberts, supra note 26, at 171 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 
(1984)); see also Chin & Holmes, supra note 4, at 712. 
 184. Roberts, supra note 26, at 171–72. 
 185. See Roberts, supra note 26, at 178. 
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critics note that lawyers cannot effectively advise clients, or effectively 
negotiate a plea bargain, without considering collateral consequences.186  
Therefore, a rule that does not require an attorney to discuss these collateral 
consequences with his client conflicts with that attorney’s duty to advocate 
fiercely for his client.187 
Despite these criticisms, courts continue to adhere to the rule.  The 
concurring and dissenting opinions in Padilla discuss several major 
justifications for this adherence.  Justice Alito’s concurring opinion in 
Padilla reasons that the “collateral-consequences rule expresses an 
important truth” that criminal defense attorneys have expertise regarding 
criminal proceedings, but not regarding other areas of the law.188  Justice 
Alito also implicitly raises the “slippery slope” issue.  He worries that 
abandoning the collateral consequences rule could result in attorneys having 
to warn their clients about every possible consequence of a conviction, 
which becomes unmanageable.189  Additionally, Justice Scalia provides 
textual and doctrinal support for the rule in his dissenting opinion in 
Padilla.190  He points out that the Sixth Amendment applies only to 
criminal prosecutions, and should have no application to collateral matters 
that are largely civil.191  He also observes that the principle of stare decisis 
mandates adherence to the collateral consequences rule.192  Finally, Justice 
Scalia echoes Justice Alito’s concerns that abandoning the collateral 
consequences rule would have “no logical stopping-point,” and would 
result in a floodgate of litigation surrounding counsel’s failure to warn of 
consequences of a guilty plea previously categorized as collateral.193 
II.  COURTS CLASH ON THE MEANING OF PADILLA V. KENTUCKY FOR 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIMS 
This Part sets forth the split among courts regarding the impact of Padilla 
v. Kentucky on ineffective assistance of counsel jurisprudence.  Specifically, 
courts disagree over whether Padilla upends the traditional collateral 
consequences rule.  The “no impact” courts have found that Padilla simply 
named deportation as an isolated exception to the rule.  No impact courts 
therefore continue to require defense counsel to warn defendants only of the 
 
 186. See Chin & Holmes, supra note 4, at 736; Margaret Colgate Love, Collateral 
Consequences After Padilla v. Kentucky:  From Punishment to Regulation, 31 ST. LOUIS U. 
PUB. L. REV. 87, 114 (2011). 
 187. See Chin & Holmes, supra note 4, at 736. 
 188. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 376 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring) (“[I]t is 
unrealistic to expect [criminal defense attorneys] to provide expert advice on matters that lie 
outside their area of training and experience.”).  For a more complete discussion of Justice 
Alito’s concurrence in Padilla, see supra Part I.C.3. 
 189. Padilla, 559 U.S. at 375–77. 
 190. Id. at 389–90 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 191. See id. at 389 (“We have limited the Sixth Amendment to legal advice directly 
related to defense against prosecution of the charged offense.”). 
 192. See id. at 389–90. 
 193. See id. at 390. 
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narrowly defined direct consequences.194  Conversely, the “innovator” 
courts have begun to change their understanding of the consequences of a 
guilty plea based on the factors considered by the Padilla Court.  These 
innovator courts have required defense counsel to warn defendants of 
consequences previously considered to be collateral, effectively broadening 
the scope of direct consequences. 
Presented with traditional collateral consequences that stem 
automatically from a plea or a conviction, like the deportation consequence 
in Padilla, the no impact courts and the innovator courts have reached 
different results based upon their interpretations of the Supreme Court’s 
discussion of the collateral consequences rule and the deportation 
consequence in Padilla.  The next two sections discuss these 
interpretations, found in state court opinions after Padilla. 
A.  No Impact Courts Find That Padilla’s Holding Is Limited to Deportation 
and Does Not Impact the Collateral Consequences Rule 
This section addresses opinions from the no impact courts that treat 
Padilla as an isolated exception to the collateral consequences rule.  These 
no impact courts have refused to interpret Padilla in a manner that upsets 
the traditional collateral consequences rule.195  As a result, in these 
jurisdictions, an attorney still has no duty to warn of traditional collateral 
consequences, even those stemming automatically from a guilty plea. 
No impact courts considering ineffective assistance of counsel claims 
based upon defense counsel’s failure to warn of a traditional collateral 
consequence stemming automatically from a guilty plea have determined 
that Padilla has no impact on the direct-collateral distinction outside of the 
deportation context.196  This section examines opinions by four no impact 
courts facing ineffective assistance of counsel claims based on the failure to 
warn of ineligibility to possess a firearm,197 lifetime predatory offender 
registration,198 ineligibility for parole,199 and mandatory forfeiture of a state 
pension.200  First, the factual background of each case is introduced.  Then, 
the courts’ interpretations and applications of Padilla is discussed. 
 
 194. See supra notes 31–37 and accompanying text. 
 195. Steele v. State, 291 P.3d 466 (Idaho Ct. App. 2012); Robinson v. State, No. A11-
550, 2012 WL 118259 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 28, 2012); Sames v. State, 805 N.W.2d 565 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2011); Commonwealth v. Abraham, 62 A.3d 343 (Pa. 2012). 
 196. Steele, 291 P.3d at 470–71; Robinson, 2012 WL 118259, at *1; Sames, 805 N.W.2d 
at 566. 
 197. Sames, 805 N.W.2d at 565–66. 
 198. Robinson, 2012 WL 118259, at *3. 
 199. Steele, 291 P.3d at 468. 
 200. Abraham, 62 A.3d at 344. 
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1.  Just the Facts:  The Factual Backdrop of the No Impact Cases 
This section introduces the factual circumstances and procedural postures 
from which the no impact courts evaluated the ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims.  Each of the four no impact cases is discussed in turn. 
In Sames v. State,201 defendant Thomas Robert Sames pled guilty to 
misdemeanor domestic assault under subdivision 1 of section 609.2242 of 
the Minnesota Statutes.202  Pursuant to subdivision 3 of that section, a 
person convicted of a misdemeanor domestic assault involving a firearm 
automatically forfeits the right to possess that firearm.203  Approximately 
one month later, after sentencing, Sames moved to withdraw his guilty plea 
on ineffective assistance of counsel grounds.204 
Sames argued that his counsel failed to inform him that the plea could 
render him ineligible to possess a firearm.205  In his moving papers, Sames 
asserted that this consequence was particularly serious for him because he 
was an avid hunter, and he supplied much of his family’s food by 
hunting.206  The district court denied Sames’s motion, and he appealed.207 
In Robinson v. State,208 defendant Tony Terrell Robinson entered an 
Alford plea209 to one count of criminal sexual conduct in the first degree.210  
A person convicted of that offense is automatically subject to mandatory 
lifetime predatory offender registration.211  Robinson’s counsel informed 
him of the registration requirement, but did not specify that it was a lifetime 
requirement.212 
After sentencing, Robinson moved to withdraw his guilty plea, asserting 
that it was invalid because he did not know about the lifetime registration 
requirement.213  The district court denied the motion, and Robinson 
appealed, asserting that he received ineffective assistance of counsel 
because his lawyer did not advise him that his plea required lifetime 
predatory offender registration.214 
In Steele v. State,215 defendant Earl Wayne Steele entered an Alford plea 
to one count of sexual abuse of a child under sixteen years of age.216  A 
 
 201. Sames, 805 N.W.2d at 565. 
 202. Id. at 566. 
 203. MINN STAT. ANN. § 609.2242 subdiv. 3 (West 2009). 
 204. Sames, 805 N.W.2d at 566. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. 
 208. No. A11-550, 2012 WL 118259 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 28, 2012). 
 209. The Alford plea was established in North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).  By 
entering an Alford plea, the defendant accepts all ramifications of a guilty verdict without 
admitting to having committed the crime. Id. at 37. 
 210. Robinson, 2012 WL 118259, at *1; see also MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.342 (West 
2009). 
 211. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 243.166, subdiv. 1b(a)(1)(iii) (West 2010 & Supp. 2013). 
 212. Robinson, 2012 WL 118259, at *1. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. 
 215. 291 P.3d 466 (Idaho Ct. App. 2012). 
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person convicted of that crime is subject to mandatory predatory offender 
registration.217  The district court sentenced Steele to fifteen years in 
prison.218  Steele filed a petition for postconviction relief.219  He asserted 
ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to warn him 
that his plea could render him ineligible for parole.220  The district court 
denied the petition, and Steele appealed.221 
Finally, in Commonwealth v. Abraham,222 defendant Joseph Abraham, a 
high school teacher, pled guilty to one count of corruption of a minor and 
one count of indecent assault.223  A conviction for indecent assault triggers 
the Public Employee Pension Forfeiture Act224 (PEPFA).  Under the Act, 
no public employee can receive any retirement or other benefit if he pleads 
guilty to a crime related to public employment.225  Abraham filed a motion 
to withdraw his plea, which the trial court denied.226  He subsequently filed 
a petition for postconviction relief, asserting ineffective assistance of 
counsel because his lawyer failed to inform him that he would forfeit his 
pension upon pleading guilty.227 
The postconviction relief court denied the petition, finding that counsel 
was not ineffective.228  On appeal, the Superior Court reversed, holding that 
under Padilla, defense counsel was required to warn criminal defendants of 
“definite, immediate and automatic” consequences, such as pension 
forfeiture.229  The Commonwealth appealed, asking the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court to determine “[w]hether, in light of Padilla v. Kentucky, the 
distinction in Pennsylvania between direct and collateral consequences . . . 
is appropriate.”230 
2.  The Interpretive Gloss:  The No Impact Courts’ Assessment of Padilla 
This section details the arguments asserted by the defendants in the no 
impact cases.  It also tracks the courts’ responses to those arguments and 
the reasoning by which the courts concluded that Padilla has no impact on 
 
 216. Id. at 468; see also IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-1506 (2004 & Supp. 2013). 
 217. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-8304 (2004). 
 218. Steele, 291 P.3d at 468. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. at 468–69. 
 221. Id. at 469. 
 222. 62 A.3d 343 (Pa. 2012). 
 223. Id. at 344. 
 224. 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1311–1315 (West 2009); see also Abraham, 62 A.3d at 
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 225. 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1312–1313. 
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 229. Id. at 345–46. 
 230. Id. at 346 (citation omitted). 
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the direct-collateral consequences distinction for purposes of an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim. 
The defendants in the no impact cases asserted that similarities between 
deportation and the collateral consequence at issue in their cases should 
compel the court to dispose of the collateral consequences rule,231 create 
additional exceptions to it,232 or find the consequence at issue to be a direct 
consequence.233 
For example, in Abraham, the defendant put forth two alternative 
arguments urging the court to reconsider the collateral consequences rule in 
light of Padilla.  First, the defendant argued that “Padilla [did] not require 
[the c]ourt to abandon the direct versus collateral consequence analysis.”234  
Instead, the defendant urged an interpretation of Padilla that “requires . . . 
the reviewing court [to] consider the severity of the consequences 
implicated by a plea, the real effect of the consequence on the defendant 
and the burden on counsel of providing advice as to the consequence.”235 
The defendant argued that pension forfeiture under PEPFA was a 
particularly severe consequence and was difficult to divorce from the 
conviction.  Defendant pointed out that under PEPFA, he was required to 
forfeit his “primary source of income,” and that this forfeiture affected not 
only defendant, but also his wife, who would forfeit pension benefits 
“should Mr. Abraham predecease her.”236  Defendant observed that the 
pension forfeiture was far more severe than the criminal sanction of three 
years’ probation.237 
Furthermore, the defendant asserted that pension forfeiture under PEPFA 
is “inseparable from the criminal process.”238  The defendant concluded, 
therefore, that like deportation in Padilla, pension forfeiture under PEPFA 
“does not fall readily into the traditional direct versus collateral 
consequence analysis.”239  Given the severity of the pension forfeiture and 
its intimate relationship to the criminal charge, the defendant urged the 
court to hold that counsel was required to warn of that consequence.240 
While the no impact courts acknowledged that, like deportation, these 
collateral consequences could be seen as “intimately related to the criminal 
 
 231. Robinson v. State, No. A11-550, 2012 WL 118259, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 17, 
2012); Reply Brief of Appellant at 8, Steele v. State, 291 P.3d 466 (Idaho Ct. App. 2012) 
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 232. Sames v. State, 805 N.W.2d 565, 566, 569 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011); Brief of the 
Appellee at 6, Commonwealth v. Abraham, 62 A.3d 343 (Pa. 2012) (No. 36 WAP 2010), 
2011 WL 2646523. 
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 236. Id. at 12. 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. at 19. 
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 240. Id. 
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process” and were perhaps “nearly an automatic result” of a guilty plea,241 
they did not consider these factors dispositive.  Instead, several 
countervailing considerations prevailed, resulting in determinations that 
Padilla’s holding is limited to deportation. 
First, the no impact courts emphasized the Supreme Court’s narrow focus 
on deportation in Padilla.  The Supreme Court began the Padilla decision 
with a recitation of the history of immigration law designed to demonstrate 
the “unique nature of deportation.”242  The no impact courts noted that the 
Supreme Court explicitly declined to decide whether the direct-collateral 
distinction was appropriate in the ineffective assistance of counsel 
context.243  Further, the no impact courts observed that the Supreme Court 
failed to mention the myriad of other consequences that stem automatically 
from a guilty plea.244  Based on these observations, the no impact courts 
reasoned that only the “unique nature of deportation” justified disregarding 
the distinction between direct and collateral consequences.245  Therefore, 
the no impact courts determined that Padilla had no relevance to the 
collateral consequences rule outside of the deportation context.246 
Second, no impact courts placed importance upon the precedential value 
of the collateral consequences rule,247 which has traditionally been followed 
in some of the jurisdictions of the no impact courts.248  Likewise, the 
collateral consequences at issue were traditionally considered collateral 
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consequences in those jurisdictions.249  The Padilla Court’s narrow focus 
on deportation, coupled with the well-established nature of the collateral 
consequences rule, was not enough for the no impact courts to interpret 
Padilla as effecting a sea change in the realm of ineffective assistance of 
counsel jurisprudence.250  For these courts, Padilla was simply an exception 
to a well-established and viable rule.  Therefore, the no impact courts 
denied the defendants’ ineffective assistance of counsel claims based on 
traditional collateral consequences stemming automatically from a guilty 
plea. 
B.  Innovator Courts Find That Padilla Requires Defense Attorneys To 
Warn of Other Traditional Collateral Consequences That Stem 
Automatically from a Guilty Plea 
In conflict with the no impact courts, which interpreted Padilla as 
preserving the traditional collateral consequences rule,251 innovator courts 
have construed Padilla as upsetting the traditional direct-collateral 
distinction in the context of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  This 
section addresses decisions from innovator courts252 that have reconsidered 
the definition of a direct consequence in light of the factors considered in 
the context of deportation in Padilla.253  As a result, innovator courts have 
required defense counsel to warn their clients of certain collateral 
consequences that stem automatically from a guilty plea.254  Effectively, 
these innovator courts have recast certain collateral consequences stemming 
automatically from a guilty plea as direct consequences.255 
1.  Just the Facts:  The Factual Backdrop of the Innovator Cases 
This section introduces the factual circumstances and procedural postures 
from which the innovator courts evaluated the ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims.  Each of the three innovator cases is discussed in turn. 
 
 249. See, e.g., Brooks v. State, 702 P.2d 893, 896 (Idaho Ct. App. 1985) (finding that 
parole consequences are not direct consequences of a guilty plea); Robinson, 2012 WL 
118259, at *2 (citing Kaiser v. State, 641 N.W.2d 900, 905, 907 (Minn. 2002)) (finding that 
mandatory predatory offender registration is a collateral consequence in Minnesota); State v. 
Rodriguez, 590 N.W.2d 823, 825 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999) (finding that loss of eligibility to 
possess a firearm is a collateral consequence of a guilty plea in Minnesota). 
 250. See Sames, 805 N.W.2d at 567–68. 
 251. See supra Part II.A. 
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In Taylor v. State,256 defendant Curtis Lane Taylor pled guilty to two 
counts of child molestation.257  This offense is one of the specified offenses 
in the Georgia sex offender statute.258  Taylor was, therefore, subject to 
mandatory registration as a sex offender.259 
After sentencing, Taylor met with his probation officer, who explained 
the sex offender registration requirement.260  After this initial meeting with 
the probation officer, Taylor filed a handwritten letter with the trial court 
asking to withdraw his guilty plea.261  Taylor asserted ineffective assistance 
of counsel because his trial counsel failed to inform him of the sex offender 
registration requirement prior to entry of the guilty plea.262 
The trial court denied Taylor’s motion to withdraw the guilty plea, 
invoking the collateral consequences rule.263  The trial court found that 
because sex offender registry was a collateral consequence of a guilty plea, 
counsel was not required to advise Taylor of that consequence.264  Taylor 
appealed, and the Georgia Court of Appeals reversed.265 
In People v. Fonville,266 defendant Derek Fonville pled guilty to one 
count of child enticement.267  Child enticement is a listed offense in 
Michigan’s sex offender registry act.268  By virtue of pleading guilty, 
therefore, Fonville was required to register as a sex offender.269 
At the sentencing hearing, Fonville’s counsel informed the trial court that 
Fonville wished to withdraw his guilty plea, and Fonville stated that he 
wanted a jury trial.270  Fonville asserted that he did not believe he was 
guilty of child enticement, and that when he entered the plea, he was 
unaware that he would have to register as a sex offender.271  The trial court 
denied Fonville’s motion to withdraw the guilty plea, and sentenced him to 
a term of fifty-one months to twenty years in prison.272 
After sentencing, Fonville moved once again to withdraw his guilty plea, 
but the trial court denied the motion.273  Fonville appealed this to the 
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Michigan Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of Michigan.274  Both 
appeals were denied.275 
Fonville subsequently filed a motion for relief from judgment in the trial 
court, asserting ineffective assistance of counsel because he was not 
informed of the sex offender registration requirement.276  The trial court 
denied the motion, invoking the collateral consequences rule.277  The court 
found that defense counsel’s failure to inform Fonville of the sex offender 
registration requirement, a collateral consequence of the plea, did not 
constitute ineffective assistance.278  Fonville appealed, and the Michigan 
Court of Appeals reversed.279 
In Commonwealth v. Pridham,280 defendant Pridham pled guilty to one 
count of manufacturing methamphetamine (second offense), one count of 
complicity to commit unlawful distribution of methamphetamine, and one 
count of fourth-degree controlled substance endangerment to a child.281  
Under Kentucky’s “violent offender” statute, convictions for these offenses 
automatically limit parole eligibility.282  The trial court accepted Pridham’s 
plea and sentenced him to thirty years in prison.283 
After sentencing, Pridham moved for relief from judgment.  He asserted 
that defense counsel assured him that he would be eligible for parole after 
completing twenty percent, or six years, of his thirty-year sentence.284  The 
“violent offender” statute, however, rendered Pridham ineligible for parole 
for twenty years.285  Pridham argued that counsel’s misadvice constituted 
ineffective assistance.286 
The trial court denied Pridham’s motion based on the collateral 
consequences rule.287  Because parole eligibility was a collateral 
consequence, the court held that counsel’s misadvice regarding that 
consequence did not rise to the level of ineffective assistance.288  Pridham 
appealed.  While his appeal was pending,289 the U.S. Supreme Court 
decided Padilla v. Kentucky.290  The Kentucky Court of Appeals found that 
adverse parole consequences were comparable to the deportation 
consequences in Padilla, and that Pridham’s motion for relief alleged a 
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viable ineffective assistance of counsel claim.291  The court of appeals 
therefore remanded to the trial court to determine whether defense counsel 
actually did misadvise Pridham.292  The Commonwealth of Kentucky 
moved for discretionary review, asking the Kentucky Supreme Court to 
determine whether the court of appeals read Padilla too broadly.293 
2.  The Interpretive Gloss:  Innovator Courts’ Assessment of Padilla 
This part surveys the defendants’ arguments in the innovator cases.  It 
also sets out the courts’ responses to those arguments and the reasoning by 
which the courts concluded that Padilla required a change in the traditional 
direct-collateral consequences distinction for purposes of an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim. 
Each innovator court discussed above is located in a jurisdiction that 
subscribed to the collateral consequences rule prior to Padilla.294  The 
consequences at issue in each case were traditionally considered collateral 
consequences,295 but were also automatically triggered by a guilty plea.296 
The defendants in these cases asserted that these traditional collateral 
consequences they faced as a result of pleading guilty should be considered 
direct consequences in light of Padilla.297  One court explicitly agreed with 
the defendants,298 and two courts’ holdings implicitly affirmed the 
defendants’ arguments.299  Several considerations drove these courts to 
determine that Padilla’s holding requires certain collateral consequences 
stemming automatically from a guilty plea to be termed direct. 
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394 S.W.3d 867, 879 (Ky. 2012) (concluding that trial counsel’s misadvice concerning 
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First, instead of viewing Padilla as an outlier decision, these courts 
determined that Padilla called into question the precedential value of the 
collateral consequences rule in the context of ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims.300  One court noted that deportation had been historically 
considered a collateral consequence in its jurisdiction.301  Since Padilla 
abrogated that characterization and refused to employ the collateral 
consequences rule at all,302 these courts reasoned that Padilla also cast 
doubt on existing direct-collateral characterizations of other 
consequences.303  Therefore, these courts felt it was necessary to reassess 
those consequences in light of Padilla. 
In contrast with the no impact courts,304 the innovator courts did not 
interpret Padilla as focusing narrowly on deportation.  Instead, these courts 
found that Padilla changed the inquiry about what constitutes a direct 
consequence for the purposes of an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim.305  Innovator courts used several factors articulated by the Supreme 
Court in Padilla306 to reshape the definition of a direct consequence:  
prevailing professional norms,307 the severity of the consequence,308 
whether the consequence is “intimately related to the criminal process,”309 
and whether the consequence is “nearly an automatic result” of the 
conviction or plea.310  Abandoning the traditional definition of a direct 
consequence of a guilty plea, these courts determined that the Padilla 
factors now controlled the scope of direct consequences of a guilty plea.311 
Using these factors, the innovator courts determined that mandatory sex 
offender registration and ineligibility for parole qualified as direct 
consequences of a guilty plea.312  One court noted that these determinations 
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ran contrary to prior case law.313  However, the innovator courts found their 
conclusions necessary in light of the newly articulated ineffective assistance 
of counsel inquiry and standard in Padilla.314 
III.  RESHAPING THE DEFINITION OF DIRECT CONSEQUENCES IN LIGHT OF 
THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN PADILLA V. KENTUCKY 
This Part first assesses the viability of the collateral consequences rule 
for purposes of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, and finds that the 
rule should be preserved because it serves a valid purpose.  Next, this Part 
considers the immigration motivations for the Padilla Court’s decision, and 
finds that, despite the “unique” nature of deportation, courts should employ 
the Padilla advisory to redefine the scope of direct consequences for 
purposes of ineffective assistance of counsel jurisprudence.315  This Note 
concludes that lower courts should preserve the collateral consequences rule 
but abolish the current bright-line definition of direct consequences in light 
of the Supreme Court’s discussion of deportation in Padilla. 
A.  The Collateral Consequences Rule Serves an Important Purpose 
The collateral consequences rule was not created for use in the context of 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims.316  Nevertheless, almost every 
lower court in the United States uses the rule.317  Therefore, the relevant 
question to ask is whether the collateral consequences rule serves a valid 
purpose in the context of ineffective assistance of counsel jurisprudence.  
Despite scathing criticism of the rule,318 the prudent discussions of the rule 
in Padilla in Justice Alito’s concurrence and Justice Scalia’s dissent,319 and 
other practical considerations, suggest that the rule does serve a valid 
purpose. 
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N.W.2d at 894–95. 
 315. See supra Part II.B. 
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As Justice Alito shrewdly observed, in the absence of the collateral 
consequences rule, attorneys may be obligated to warn clients about each 
and every possible potential consequence of a guilty plea.320  This scenario 
is unworkable from the standpoint of criminal defense attorneys, judges, 
and general practicality. 
Criminal defense attorneys are, by definition, experts at navigating 
criminal proceedings321—guilty pleas included.  However, these attorneys 
do not possess that same level of expertise for other areas of the law,322 
which may relate to collateral consequences of the criminal proceeding.  It 
is unrealistic to expect criminal defense attorneys to quickly become experts 
in these areas in order to anticipate a vast array of potential consequences of 
a guilty plea for each client.323  The collateral consequences rule is an 
important benchmark upon which attorneys can rely in order to ensure that 
they are providing effective assistance of counsel. 
From a judicial perspective, eliminating the collateral consequences rule 
would disrupt years of ineffective assistance of counsel jurisprudence.324  
Courts would no longer have a reliable benchmark upon which to evaluate 
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim under Strickland.  This raises 
judicial consistency and reliance concerns, although for different reasons 
than those articulated by Justice Scalia.325 
However, an even more pressing concern exists.  Without the collateral 
consequences rule, judges have a higher level of discretion over which 
consequences a defense attorney must warn his client about.  Different 
judges in the same jurisdiction may have differing views on what 
constitutes effective assistance, resulting in unpredictable ineffective 
assistance of counsel jurisprudence.  Further, eliminating the collateral 
consequences rule would open the door to a myriad of new foundations for 
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  If some of these claims are put 
forth in bad faith, or in an attempt to withdraw a guilty plea after a change 
of heart, judicial economy suffers. 
B.  While Deportation Is “Different,”326 Padilla Should Prompt Lower 
Courts To Reshape the Definition of Direct Consequences 
The Supreme Court made clear that the motivations underlying the 
Padilla decision stemmed primarily from concerns regarding immigration 
law and the nature of deportation.327  Deportation is a unique consequence 
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of a guilty plea.328  However, this does not mean that Padilla cannot have 
any implications for the collateral consequences rule in the broader context 
of ineffective assistance of counsel jurisprudence.  Padilla raises an 
important point:  while certain consequences of a guilty plea may have 
appeared quite distinct from the criminal conviction in the past, they are 
now so intimately linked that a rethinking of the definition of direct 
consequences is in order.329  Therefore, courts should interpret Padilla as 
requiring that defense counsel advise criminal defendants of other 
traditional collateral consequences stemming automatically from a guilty 
plea.330 
1.  Deportation Really Is “Different” 
In Padilla, the Supreme Court cited no precedent for its decision to 
require defense counsel to warn criminal defendants of the deportation 
consequences of a guilty plea.331  Instead, the Court referenced the 
“severity” of the deportation consequence for noncitizens like Jose 
Padilla.332  The Court proceeded to hold that Padilla’s counsel rendered 
ineffective assistance in failing to warn Padilla that pleading guilty would 
result in his deportation.333  This rhetoric, and the subsequent holding, 
harkens back to earlier immigration cases that cited similar concerns.334  
Padilla is best situated in the context of these immigration cases, continuing 
a Supreme Court trend of affording additional (and in this case, 
constitutional) rights to aliens.335 
Deportation is a high-stakes consequence for noncitizens.336  Although 
certain other consequences of a criminal conviction can change the life of a 
defendant, none do so as drastically as automatic forcible removal from the 
country in which one resides.337  In recognition of this fact, the neat 
categorization of deportation as “civil” is slowly eroding.338  Over the past 
century, and especially over the past twenty years, immigration and 
criminal law have become enmeshed in an unprecedented way.339  
Commentators have suggested that immigration no longer falls squarely 
into the civil or criminal category.340 
It appears that the Supreme Court has recognized this change in Padilla.  
While employing the traditional “civil” label to describe deportation, the 
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Court also qualified that label, noting that deportation is “intimately related 
to the criminal process.”341  While courts have recognized that certain other 
traditional collateral consequences stemming automatically from a guilty 
plea are also intimately related to the criminal process,342 none of these 
consequences has the rich history that deportation does.  Further, none of 
these consequences has been said to straddle the civil-criminal divide in the 
same way as immigration consequences. 
Based on the unique nature of deportation, the Supreme Court in Padilla 
refused to employ the collateral consequences rule in its evaluation of 
Padilla’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim.343  However, it is 
important to note that the Court also did not expressly invalidate the rule.344  
As previously discussed, the collateral consequences rule serves a valid 
purpose.345  Therefore, courts are correct to find that Padilla did not 
abrogate the rule.346  Nevertheless, the fact that the Supreme Court felt the 
need to depart from precedent in order to reach a just outcome suggests that 
the rule in its current form requires certain changes.  Courts that treat 
Padilla as an outlier decision and interpret the opinion as leaving the 
collateral consequences rule completely intact have overlooked this 
important point.347 
2.  Padilla v. Kentucky Should Prompt Courts To Rethink the Definition of 
Direct Consequences for the Purposes of an Ineffective Assistance 
of Counsel Claim 
While the operation of the collateral consequences rule in the ineffective 
assistance of counsel context serves valid purposes, the definition of direct 
consequences in that context need not necessarily mirror that used in Fifth 
Amendment due process jurisprudence.  The language surrounding the 
Supreme Court’s discussion of the nature of a deportation consequence348 
should prompt lower courts to redefine direct consequences for purposes of 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims. 
Currently, the scope of the direct-collateral distinction follows the line 
separating civil consequences from criminal consequences.349  Even though 
some courts define direct consequences as those that are “definite, 
immediate and largely automatic,”350 the civil-criminal divide seems to be 
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what truly drives the distinction.351  As some of the post-Padilla cases have 
demonstrated, consequences triggered automatically upon entry of a guilty 
plea or upon conviction, such as sex offender registration or forfeiture of a 
state pension, have nevertheless been considered collateral because they are 
civil, not criminal, in nature.352  However, the fact that a consequence is 
civil does not mean that it cannot have severe and debilitating effects on a 
defendant.353  Not requiring defense counsel to advise criminal defendants 
of collateral (in essence,  civil) consequences of a guilty plea as a 
categorical matter draws an arbitrary and unfair line for viable ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims.354 
Instead, courts should employ a more functional definition of direct 
consequences.  This definition would incorporate analysis from Strickland, 
the doctrinal foundation of ineffective assistance of counsel 
jurisprudence,355 and the Padilla factors that the Supreme Court considered 
when exempting deportation from the traditional rule.356  Strickland 
mandates a case-by-case approach to ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims, rejecting application of a bright-line rule.357  However, in the 
absence of any sort of rule, courts would have no baseline with which to 
evaluate an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  Therefore, while 
adhering to the collateral consequences rule, courts should adopt a case-by-
case determination of what constitutes a direct consequence for each 
particular defendant.  In doing so, courts should consider the factors 
focused on by the Padilla Court:  the severity of the consequence for the 
particular defendant, whether the consequence results automatically from 
the conviction, and whether the consequence is so closely related to the 
conviction that it is difficult to separate the two.358 
While criminal defense attorneys are certainly experts at navigating 
criminal proceedings,359 they are also experts in another area—their clients.  
Therefore, although it may be unrealistic to expect criminal defense 
attorneys to become versed in any area of the law which may be implicated 
by a particular guilty plea, it is not overly burdensome to require attorneys 
to understand which potential consequences may be most important to their 
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clients, and to advise their clients accordingly.  This formulation of the rule 
avoids any potential “perverse incentives” for a defense attorney to decline 
to provide advice about “collateral consequences,” such as those involved 
with the affirmative misadvice exception employed by some lower 
courts.360  In fact, it creates positive incentives for criminal defense 
attorneys to ensure that their clients are informed of the potential 
consequences most important to them. 
Padilla’s holding should prompt lower courts to reconsider the definition 
of direct consequences when applying the collateral consequences rule.361  
The factors considered by the Supreme Court in Padilla provide an 
excellent foundation upon which to redefine the scope of “direct 
consequences” of a guilty plea.362  This remains true even though the 
Court’s motivations stemmed primarily from concerns regarding 
immigration law.363 
CONCLUSION 
The U.S. Supreme Court held in Padilla v. Kentucky364 that a defense 
counsel must advise his client of the potential deportation consequences of 
a guilty plea.365  In so holding, the Court refused to validate the collateral 
consequences rule for the purposes of an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim.366  Instead, the Court focused on the unique qualities of deportation, 
a traditional collateral consequence, that make it an exception to that 
rule.367 
Despite this Supreme Court decision, the collateral consequences rule has 
important application in the context of ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims.  For practical and policy reasons, lower courts should not interpret 
Padilla as eradicating the collateral consequences rule.368  However, given 
the criteria invoked in the Supreme Court’s analysis of the deportation 
consequence in Padilla, and the Strickland mandate that an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, lower 
courts should redefine “direct consequence” for the purposes of an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim so that other traditional collateral 
consequences that stem automatically from a guilty plea may properly be 
considered direct.369  Courts should employ the factors considered by the 
Supreme Court in Padilla, determining which consequences of a guilty plea 
are particularly severe for an individual defendant and labeling all other 
consequences collateral.  This creates proper incentives for attorneys to 
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warn defendants of the consequences most important to them, and for 
defendants to bring an ineffective assistance of counsel claim only in good 
faith. 
 
